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Caribbean Basin Plan - Some U. S. Preliminary Views 
The United States President, Ronald Reagan, announced in May 
of the current year, that his Administration has approved a new plan 
christened as "The Caribbean Basin Development" and later referred to 
in the press as a "Mini-Marshall Plan for the Caribbean and Central 
America." This initiative, which leaves some room for international 
or multilateral cooperation, is intended to counteract the sustained 
process of deterioration of the Caribbean economic situation as a 
consequence of increasing petroleum bills for the oil-importing countries 
of this area, lower prices for their main export commodities —that 
culminate into severe strains on-their balance of payment positions— 
and finally in a dangerous level of external indebtedness. 
I. Some Background of the U.S. Initiative 
In its inception the initiative was conceived in the framework of 
the East-West rivalry that is the mainstay of the Reagan's perception 
of international relation. Against the prospects of rising unemployment 
rates, falling living standards and their corollary of social unrest 
it is estimated that some decisions should be taken in order to 
counteract by both military and economic assistance, what 
the U.S. Administration perceives as a situation favoring increasing 
Cuban activities in an area, usually considered as its third border. 
After some preliminary exchange of views between the Presidents Reagan 
and Lopez Portillo, followed by the meeting of the U.S. Secretary of 
State, Alenxader Haig with the Foreign Ministers Mark MacGingan of 
Canada, Jorge Castañeda of Mexico, and José Alberto Zambrano Velasco 
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of Venezuela, held in Nassau, Bahamas, on July 1981,"the military 
aspects as well as the previous conditions for the assistance were 
put aside at the request of Mexico and Venezuela. Instead the socio-
economic needs of the Caribbean Basin countries, were stressed, the 
various delegates pointing out that though the region is receiving 
economic assistance from various quarters, more coordinated efforts 
through consultation are needed so that donor and receiving countries 
can decide what the needs are and what type of help might be granted. 
The concise final communique distributed at the end of the Nassau 
meeting, is henceforth the basis of an economic assistance plan for 
"the Caribbean Basin development." 
The U.S. Trade Representative, W. E. Brock, has been charged with 
developing and coordinating an integrated and comprehensive economic 
approach toward the Caribbean Basin. 
II. Some Features of the Economic Approach Toward the Caribbean Basin 
As previously stated the approach toward the Caribbean Basin 
economic situation is under study and nodefinite guidelines have been 
set up regarding its orientation and perspective; whether it would be 
an exclusive U.S. approach after consultation with Mexico, Venezuela, 
and the Caribbean countries involved, or whether it will be enlarged 
to incorporate the group of countries or international organizations 
already included in the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic 
Development (CGCED). However, from some statements made before Congress, 
especially the Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs, some global 
features of the projected plan, can be inferred. 
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Particular attention in this aspect will be paid-to the testimony 
of S. L. Lande, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Bilateral Affairs, 
this office being in charge of implementing the aforementioned economic 
approach toward the Caribbean Basin. 
1) Some Underlying Caveats 
Although recognizing that without major changes in economic policies 
and structures, the problems of the Caribbean will intensify, Mr. Lande 
in this statement began emphasizing some general underlying caveats. First, 
he states that: " Massive new public financial assistance flows from the U.S. 
are unlikely to be available due to budgetary:'considerations. So, publicity 
concerning a Mini-Marshall Plan is misleading, has no basis in reality 
and creates improper expectations." Second, he signals that: "It must 
be clear that the U.S. plan will not be imposed on others. On the contrary, 
U.S. Government cannot get domestic support without the active and 
creative support of the intended beneficiaries as well as the other 
countries interested in the economic growth of the Caribbean Basin." 
Finally, it is emphasized that U.S. assistance will be concentrated in 
those countries that show willingness to undertake serious economic 
policy reforms. 
2) Broad Framework of the Plan 
As recorded before, the U.S. Administration has developed a long list 
of possible options, some of which will be refined through consultations, 
and others deleted or added. Anyway, for the moment, the basic ideas 
center around the way: 
a) to increase the productive capacity of the area, 
b) provide incentives to trade, and 
c) stimulate private investment, which in turn will provide 
production, employment facilities and enhance competitiveness. 
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lt is understood that the Governments will remove internal constraints 
on trade and investment if these inhibit economic growth. 
Regarding the first point the plan intends primarily to channel 
resources into activités that quickly revive agricultural and industrial 
production and create employment. At the same time, assistance will be 
provided to these countries in order to enable them to correct their 
external economic disequilibria thrbugh adequate stabilization programs. 
In the area of basic social services, it is estimated that while 
innovative programs in health and education for developing human resources 
will be supported, no large commitments of new resources will be needed 
in most countries during the next first 3 or 4 years because of AID*s 
current pipeline for social programs and the contribution of other donor 
countries. 
In the field of trade, ways of expanding access into the U.S. market 
for Caribbean products are under consideration. In this respect, It is 
pointed out that the U.S. already receives nearly 60% of the Caribbean 
area export, with 86% of this amount entering this country on a 
duty free basis. Furthermore, U.S. provides even a larger portion of 
its tourists. It is agreed, however, that further access to the U.S. 
market could have major impact in the small countries' economies. 
^ Finally, in relation to investment, it is considered that the 
first step in this field is to identify the major obstacles to private 
investment and devise mechanisms to remove them. Various measures are 
being weighed in order to protect private investments among them, e;g. 
expanded insurance activities through OPIC (Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation), or bilateral investment treaty covering the relationship 
between Government and private investors. 
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It should be mentioned here that the U.S. pledges" its support for 
strengthening regional economic integration and regional cooperation 
in view of the advantages derived by each country from the regional 
organizations existing in the area such as: The Central American 
Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In this 
regard, U.S. establishes as its basic objective, the full integration 
of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands into mutually beneficial economic 
activities within the Caribbean. 
3) Financial and Technical Assistance 
3.1 Financial Assistance 
There is no clear commitment-regarding the ways to meet the financial 
needs of the Caribbean and Centro-American countries involved in the 
U.S. Grand Project. The policy in this field is. cautious and vague, 
and even contradictory. For instance, while some U.S. officials 
circumscribe financial assistance within the actual budgetary 
contraints, others sustain that within those constraints a substantial 
additional effort for the Caribbean basin should be made; and that the 
assistance should be provided through quick-disbursing mechanisms. They 
also mention that development assistance funds will not be enough; they 
must be completed by supplementary resources as those of the types of 
PL480 programs and TDP activities, etc. 
Finally, room is made for the participation of other countries and 
international financial institutions in providing financial assistance. 
From the U.S. point of view, increased assistance should be closely 
geared to supporting private investment opportunities, and provided 
under the general guidelines that: "While the overall concept of action 
should be multilateral, actual benefits should be given on a bilateral 
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basis, so that the conditions of each recipient and each donor can be 
satisfied." 
3.2) Technical Assistance 
No more to the point is the U.S. focus on the way to solve the acute 
shortage of trained personnel to support the Caribbean development 
projects. This shortage in various fields such as health, education, 
nutrition, and other technical aspects, is generally recognized. But 
instead of any suggestion as to how to train local technicians, "the 
emphasis is being given to the area of agricultural research, extension 
and education, in which U.S. universities, through the Title XII Program" 
can mobilize some of the best expertise in the world to help overcome 
the problems of hunger and malnutrition" (sic). 
III. Conclusion 
Since consultation between the U.S. Government, the affected parties 
and some traditional donor countries of the OECD are foreseen, it is too 
soon to fully assess the program. Therefore, this conclusion will focus 
on only some general views or doubts expressed by Caribbean and Latin 
American leaders regarding what so.far has been said by the Reagan's 
Administration spokesmen. 
Regarding the amount of the package, Edward Seaga, Prime Minister 
of Jamaica, told the OAS in June 1981, that official aid from the donor 
countries would have to more than double to $3 billion a year with a view 
to doubling the per capita income of the region in the next 15 years. 
With respect to the general orientation of the aid promised, there 
is the perception that a plan to stabilizing basic commodities export 
prices, would do more for Third World economies than private investments 
on which hinge the Reagan's views of external assistance. 
Finally, it is believed that the success of the Reagan's Plan will 
depend almost entirely on how far his Administration will be able to 
overcome its ideological and Cuba-oriented prejudices and show genuine 
concern for the development of the region. A clue on this aspect could 
be found not only through Mexico and Venezuela official statements, but 
again in a recent one made by the Caribbean member countries of the 
Caribbean Development Bank regarding the pressure brought by the U.S. 
Administration to bear on them to vote against loans for Granada. They 
made it clear that if U.S. money came with such conditions attached, 
they would prefer not to have it. 
The East-West orientation of the U.S. Administration, and the actual 
financial constraints derived from a defense-oriented U.S. "budget, are 
leading some Caribbean and Latin American countries to ask themselves 
if the U.S. is truly interested in helping them outside of the context of 
the East-West confrontation. 
cc: Mr. Gert Rosenthal 
Mr. Silbourne St. A. Clarke 
Mr. Eric Calcagno 
Mr. Andres Bianchi 

